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No.11189 
Case 
BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENTS 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Statement of Facts by Appellants is incom-
plete. The primary complaint on appeal is that the evi-
dence does not justify the judgment approving the ap-
plication. Much of the supporting evidence is not 
included in Appellants' Statement of Facts. In this 
regard, however, we believe that the additional evidence 
can be more clearly presented in answer to Appellants' 
specific points on appeal. 
1 
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It perhaps should be noted here that both the State 
Engineer and the trial court have approved the appli-
cation, and we will endeavor to demonstrate that under 
the controlling legal principles and the evidence pre-
sented, the order approving the application was proper. 
POINT I 
SECTION 73-3-8, U.C.A. 1953, AS THE SAME 
WAS AMENDED IN 1939, HAS BEEN CON-
STRUED BY THE COURT MANY TLMES, 
AND UNDER ALL THE CASES THE COURT 
HAS HELD THAT APPLICATIONS TO AP-
PROPRIATE WATER SHOULD. BE FA V-
O RED. 
We do not deny that an applicant is required (un-
less the issues are restricted by stipulation or a pre-
tri11l order) to off er evidence concerning all of the 
factors set forth in Section 78-3-8, U.C.A. 1953. How-
ever, the quantum of proof required is not the same as 
would be required in a regular judicial type proceeding 
where the determination is res judicata, and the rights 
of the parties are finally fixed. Before the amendment, 
the statute required the State Engineer to inquire into 
the availability of water, possible injury to prior vested 
rights, and whether the appropriation would interfere 
with the more beneficial use of the water. The 1939 
amendment added two additional factors - is the ap-
plication feasible, and was the application filed in good 
faith? 
There is absolutely nothing in the decided cases to 
suggest that the pre-1939 requirements (which are still 
2 
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in the statute) are to be governed by one set of rules as 
to the quantum of proof required, while the two new 
requirements are to be proven by more stringent stand-
ards, nor that the rules governing the quantum of proof 
have changed. 
It is apparent from the cases that litigants in this 
type of proceedings are quick to assert that the appli-
cant should be required to assume the same burdens as 
a plaintiff in a judicial proceeding. Thus - they argue 
- applicant should be required not only to offer evi-
dence on every element of his case as required by Shields 
v. Dry Creek Irr. Co., 12 Utah 2d 98, 363 P. 2d 82, but 
he should be required to establish every element by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Such an argument mis-
conceives the purpose and the nature of the permit sys-
tem. The mere filing of an application to appropriate is 
not an appropriation of water. The application but 
takes the place of and is the preliminary notice of the 
applicant's intention. Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 
108 Pac. 1112 (1910). The approval of an application to 
appropriate is only a preliminary step. It confers upon 
the applicant no perfected right to the use of water. It 
merely clothes the applicant with authority to proceed 
and perfect, if he can, his proposed application. Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 Pac. 
116 (1930). 
The State Engineer, in approving or rejecting an ap-
plication is not adjudicating rights. He performs an 
executive function. Tracy v. Bullock, 4 Utah 2d 370, 
294 P. 2d 707 (1956); Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 
3 
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77 P. 2d 362 (1938); United States v. District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial Dist., 121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132 
(1951); Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Ut. 215, 203 P. 2d 
922 (1949). 
The objective of the State Engineer's office is to 
maintain order and efficiency in the appropriation of 
water. United States v. District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial Dist., supra. 
After the applicant receives his approval and after 
he has been given a reasonable time for experimenta-
tion, and to complete the construction of works, the 
applicant must submit proof of appropriation, (Sec-
tion 73-3-16) and the State Engineer, if he is satisfied 
that some appropriation has been completed, issues a 
certificate of appropriation which becomes prima facie 
evidence of the right. (Sec. 73-3-17) 
It is perhaps understandable that litigants over 
the years have sought to impose on the applicant the 
burden of proving all elements of his water right by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and to have the court 
deny the application if the applicant didn't meet this 
burden. We say that it is understandable, because the 
statute does provide for notice. (Section 73-3-6.) Inter-
ested persons are given an opportunity to file written 
protests. (Section 73-3-7.) The State Engineer is di-
rected to inquire into the things enumerated in Section 
73-3-8, and on the basis of these things, to approve or 
reject the application. Then any person who is ag-
grieved by the decision can appeal the decision to the 
4 
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courts. (Section 73-3-14.) The foregoing procedure 
takes the form of a judicial determination, but the de-
cision made by the State Engineer in approving or re-
jecting an application does not adjudicate rights. The 
determination made is not res judicata. Neither party 
can rely on the determination in subsequent litigation 
over the water rights. The State Engineer should not 
carry the determination he makes at the approval stage 
into the proof of appropriation procedures. In per-
forming this executive function of approving an appli-
cation, the court has again and again held that new 
applications should be favored, that doubts should be 
resolved in favor of approval, that the court should not 
require the applicant to prove the elements of his ap-
propriation by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
that only where it appears affirmatively that there is no 
reasonable basis for belief that any appropriation can 
be perfected should the application be denied. The 
rulings of the court to this effect are uniform, and there 
has been no change whatsoever in regard to the quan-
tum of proof required because of the 1939 amendment. 
This, we submit, is amply supported by the following 
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court: 
We first direct the court's attention to United 
States v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132 (1951). There the court de-
scribes the function of the State Engineer's office, notes 
that in approving or rejecting an application, the 
State Engineer is not adjudicating anything, and 
that the applicant should not be required by a "pre-
5 
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ponderance of the evidence" to prove at the appli-
cation stage that he can do all that his application 
proposes. The court notes that he should be given an 
opportunity to experiment and to demonstrate what he 
can do, and that the law should not cut off the possi-
bility of the applicant establishing some valuable rights 
simply because he cannot at the time his application 
is heard prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he can do everything his application proposes. Said 
the court: 
''The Engineer in granting an application 
does not determine that the applicant's rights 
are prior to the rights of the protestant but only 
finds there is reason to believe that the applica-
tion may be granted and some water beneficially 
used thereunder without interfering with the 
rights of others. Under such a holding, the Engi-
neer rejects applications only when it is clear 
that the applicant can establish no valuable rights 
thereunder, he does not adjudicate claims but de-
cides only that there is probable cause to believe 
that applicant may be able to establish rights un-
der his application without impairing the rights 
of others. Such a decision is administrative in 
nature and purpose and the decision of the court 
on review, except for the formalities of the trial 
and judgment is of the same nature and for the 
same purpose. The object of the engineer's office 
is to maintain order and efficiency in the appro-
priation, distribution and conservation of water 
and to allow as much water to be beneficially used 
as possible. So construed, the law provides a 
period of experimentation during which ways and 
means may be sought to make beneficial use of 
more water under the application before the 
rights of the parties are finally adjudicated. If 
6 
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we were to finally adjudicate applicant's right to 
change or to appropriate water at the time that 
such application was rejected or approved, he 
would get only such rights as he could establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he could 
use beneficially without interfering with the rights 
of others and in such hearing he would not have 
the benefit of any opportunity to experiment and 
demonstrate what he could do. Such a system 
would cut off the possibility of establishing ma;ny 
valuable rights without a chance to demonstrate 
what could be done." (Emphasis added) 
Another case which again emphasizes the executive 
nature of the State Engineer's decision is Tracy v. Bul-
lock, 4 Utah 2d 370, 294 P. 2d 707 (1956), where the rule 
is stated as follows : 
''Before considering those questions we note 
that this is not an action to adjudicate the rights 
of the parties to the use of this water. It is mere-
ly an appeal from the Engineer's decision and re-
quires only the determination of whether the ap-
plication should be approved or rejected. The 
Engineer in making that decision exercises an 
executive function, he only determines whether 
there is reason to believe from the evidence that 
there are unappropriated waters in the proposed 
source which can be appropriated to a beneficial 
use without impairing existing rights or interfer-
ing with a more beneficial use and whether the 
proposed plan is feasible and within the financial 
ability of the applicant. Our decision has only the 
effect of authorizing or denying the applicant the 
right to proceed with his plan to appropriate the 
water the same as though it were made by the 
Engineer without an appeal.'' 
7 
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In both of the two cases noted abow, the Utah 
Court cite~ with approval, its earlier decision in Eard-
ley v. Terry, 94 1.!tah 367, 77 P. 2d 362 (1938). The 
Eardley case was decided before the 1939 amendment 
referred to by Appellants. However, it has been con-
sistently cited by the Supreme Court since 1939 as 
correctly setting forth the rule to govern the State En-
gineer and the court on appeal in approving or rejecting 
an application. 
The Eardley case was dealing with the quantum of 
proof necessary to prove the three things then covered 
by Section 73-3-8, as it existed before the 1939 amend-
ment, to-wit, the availability of water, possible injury 
to prior rights, and possible interference with the more 
benefic>ial use of the water. The court squarely held that 
the applicant did not need to pro'e these specified things 
with the same quantum of proof as is required when 
the applicant submits proof of appropriation. It did say 
that if the section ·were read by itself, it would appear 
that the State Engineer, in rendering his decision, 
should impose upon the applicant the same burdens of 
proof as should be imposed upon him if this were a final 
disposition of all questions growing out of the filing of 
the application. Howe\er, said the court, the section does 
not stand alone. Sections 100-3-16 and 100-3-17 (which 
are now Sections 73-3-16 and 73-3-17) must be consid-
ered in connection with Section 8. Sections 16 and 17 
contemplate that when the works have been completed 
and the water has been applied to beneficial use, the 
applicant must submit proof of appropriation. The 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court noted that the State Engineer's determination, at 
the approval stage, does not adjudicate the respective 
rights of the parties, and really has no efficacy, except 
to allow the applicant to proceed. 
The court then dealt squarely with the quantum of 
proof, and said that it appeared clear to the court that 
the Legislature intended that when an application is filed, 
the State Engineer is called upon to determine prelimi-
narily ·whether there is probable cause to believe that any 
appropriation can be perfected. If he determines that 
there is such a probability, the application should be ap-
proved. The court then expressly said that it did not 
believe that the Legislature intended that the applicant, 
"must prove to the State Engineer, when his 
application is up for approval or rejection, by the 
same kind and quantum of proof that would be 
required were he making final proof, that he can 
make an appropriation. Such a construction, in 
view of Sections 100-3-16 and 100-3-17, would re-
quire him to take proof t"·ire, once in advance 
of and once after the construction of the necessary 
works .... " 
The court went on to note that because the approval 
is not res judicata, 
''no one can be hurt by this procedure, while at 
the same time it permits the development of our 
water resources to the utmost." (page 376) 
In Whitmore v, Welch, 114 Utah 558, 201 P. 2d 954 
(1949), the court was concerned with an appropriation 
for power purposes, and there was a dispute about the 
stretch of the stream which could be appropriated. The 
9 
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protestant argued that the application should have been 
denied, because the point of return specified in the appli-
cation was downstream from protestant 's point of intake. 
The court approved the application, imposing a condi-
tion that the water be returned so that protestant could 
receive it. Protestant argued on appeal that the appli-
cation should have been rejected, because of the conflict. 
The court held otherwise, and said: 
''To accord the meaning for which appellants 
contend to the second enumerated condition, to 
the approva1 of an application to appropriate, 
would place upon such applicant the uwwarranted 
burden of determining precisely the amount of 
unappropriated water remaining in the proposed 
source . ... Such is not the construction indicated 
by the opinion of this court in Little Cottonwood 
Water Co. v. Kimball, supra.'' (Emphasis added.) 
In Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P. 
2d 748 (1944), the court was concerned with the change 
application section which prohibits changes which will 
impair vested rights. Again the court said that if the 
section (73-3-3) is read by itself it would appear that 
the State Engineer must determine the existence or non-
existence of such vested rights before he acts, and that 
when he approves the change, he has necessarily found 
that no vested rights will be impaired. However, said 
the court, such a construction would fail to take cogni-
zance of the purpose of our Water and Irrigation Act. 
The office of the State Engineer, said the court, was not 
created to adjudicate rights, but only to supervise the 
appropriation of water. The court went on to say that 
in Eardley v. Terry, supra, the court had considered the 
10 
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duty of the State Engineer in approving or denying an 
application, and that the same rules applied to change 
applications. 
In Tanner v. Humphries, 87 Utah 164, 48 P. 2d 484, 
which also was a change application case, the court held 
that the applicant must make a general showing that the 
change will not injure others, but that he can do this by a 
general negative. The burden then moves to the person 
claiming that he will be injured, to show how he would 
be hurt. The court said that the applicant's statement 
that the change would not adversely affect the rights of 
others was a sufficient proof against a motion for a non-
suit. Said the Court: 
"It would be impracticable to require the 
plaintiff to ferret out all of the ways in which the 
others might perchance be injured and off er proof 
in negation thereof as a part of its affirmative 
case. The general negative as against injury to 
the protestants is sufficient to carry the case over 
a motion for a nonsuit in that respect." (page 
175) 
In Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P. 2d 922 
( 1949), supra, the court said: 
''It is not necessary that it be established that 
there is unappropriated waters in this source in 
order to justify the approval of the application to 
appropriate, all that is necessary is that there is 
reasonable ground to believe that such is the case. 
Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362; Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 
289 P. 116; Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Ir-
rigation Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108; Whit-
more v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954; Lehi 
11 
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Irr. Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 892. But 
the approval of this application does not mean 
that it is adjudicated that there is unappropriated 
waters at this source. The applicant still has to 
demonstrate that such is the case before a cer-
tificate of appropriation can be issued to him." 
(page 231) 
In Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kent's Lake 
Irrig. Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943), the 
court said: 
''We stated in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. 
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, 118, that the 
State Engineer should approve an application to 
appropriate water unless 
" 'it clearly appears that there is no unap-
propriated water in the proposed source. * * * 
If the question is fairly doubtful and there is 
reasonable probability that a portion of the 
waters are not necessary to supply existing 
rights the engineer should have the power 
to approve the application.' " 
In Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, et al, 115 Utah 136, 
202 P. 2d 892 (1949), the court quoted with approval 
from Eardley v. Terry, supra, and Little Cottonwood 
Water Company v. Kimball, supra, and cited other cases 
noted above, and then said : 
"If then it is not clear that there is no unappro-
priated water in the proposed source and the ap-
plicant satisfies the requirements, the State Engi-
neer should not withhold his approval.'' 
It is thus clear that the application should be ap-
proved if from the evidence the State Engineer (or the 
court on appeal) has reason to believe that some appro-
12 
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priation can be completed. In the language of the United 
States v. District Court case, supra, "under such a 
holding the Pngineer rejects applications only when it is 
clear that the applicant can establish no valuable rights 
thereunder,'' and the State Engineer does not adjudi-
cate claims, 
"but decides only that there is probable cause to 
believe that applicant may be able to establish 
rights under his application without impairing the 
rights of others. The decision is administrative, 
and its object is to maintain order and efficiency 
in appropriations, and to allow as much water to 
be beneficially used as possible.'' 
In the instant case the foregoing discussion may be 
moot, because as we will next demonstrate, the evidence 
adduced at the trial fully sustains the trial court's :find-
ings on the three issues which were reserved by the pre-
trial order. We have burdened the brief by citing all of 
the foregoing cases, because of Appellants' apparent con-
tention under Point I that the 1939 amendment had the 
effect of changing the rules and making it considerably 
more difficult for an applicant to proceed. As the fore-
going cases demonstrate, this court has continued to 
apply the rules first pronounced in Little Cottonwood 
Wa.ter Co. v. Kimball, supra, and Eardley v. Terry, 
supra. The 1939 amendment did require that the State 
Engineer inquire into feasibility, and the good faith of 
the applicant, but it did not change the rule regarding 
the quantum of proof required, nor obviously has it 
changed the rule which favors new applications, and 
resolves doubts in favor of approval. 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUSTAINS THE 
COURT'S DETERMINATION ON ALL FACT 
ISSUES SET FORTH IN THE PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER. 
A. Availability of U n,appropriated Water 
The first issue reserved for trial in the pre-trial 
order is whether there is probable cause to believe that 
there is unappropriated water in the East and Middle 
Forks of Beaver Creek. Considerable evidence was in-
troduced on this issue at the trial, but Appellants ap-
parently do not question the court's finding (Findings 
7 and 8, R. 40) that there is unappropriated water. We, 
therefore, will not discuss this issue in detail here. We 
do note that we introduced as Exhibits 5 and 6 the daily 
flow measurements on the Middle Fork and the East 
Fork of Beaver Creek. We also placed in evidence as 
Exhibits 8 and 10 a summation of the existing decreed 
rights on these sources in both Utah and Wyoming. The 
State Engineer, Mr. Lambert, testified at some length on 
these decreed rights, and the total divertible flow per-
mitted thereunder (Tr. 13-19). Mr. Proffitt plotted the 
decreed rights on a series of graphs (Ex. 13), showing 
the maximum water awarded by the Wyoming and Utah 
decrees, and then by plotting the daily stream flow on the 
charts, showed the periods of time each year when the 
streams exceeded the decreed rights. 
He also totalled the amount of water in acre feet 
available each year in these two sources from 1948 to 
1962, (Ex. 12). 
14 
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Mr. Hanks testified that there is always excess 
water (Tr. 71), and nearly every one of the Appellants, 
on cross-examination, admitted there is excess water at 
times. Mr. Wadsworth (Tr. 130) said that there would 
be excess water in June; Mr. Phillips (Tr. 134) said he 
didn't know that the application would hurt him; Mr. 
Bullock (Tr. 142) said that in April and May water flows 
to Henrys Fork and "I imagine" this could be stored 
without hurting anyone; Mr. Hickey (Tr. 157) said that 
every year water flows to Henrys Fork. 
There is thus adequate evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that there is unappropriated water. 
B. Injury to Vested Rights 
The second pre-trial issue was whether the water 
could be diverted and stored without injury to or con-
flict with prior rights. The primary contention made at 
the trial was that in the wintertime the flow of the 
streams is small and if substantial quantities were di-
verted into the Gregory Ditch and taken to the proposed 
storage location, the remaining water would freeze, and 
protestants would have no water for their livestock in 
the ·wintertime, (Tr. 127, 140, 146, 148). The court, in 
Finding No. 9, found that if the diversion of water dur-
ing freezing weather did interfere with livestock water, 
the rights of protestants could be protected by proper 
administration of the stream on a priority basis, and 
that during most, if not all, years, water could be di-
verted and stored, without interfering with prior rights 
( R. 41). The State Engineer testified that this prob-
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lem could be handled as a matter of administration 
(Tr. 25). 
This court has consistently held that the mere fact 
that an application presents some problems of river ad-
ministration is not grounds for rejection of the applica-
tion. See Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir 
Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943); and East Bench 
Irr. Co., et ail, v. Deseret Irr. Co., et al, 2 Utah 2d 170, 
271 P. 2d 449 (1954). 
Again on appeal the Appellants have not continued 
to urge this point, and we again will not burden the 
record with a detailed discussion. We will note, however, 
that there is evidence that some water might be diverted 
without problem after October 15th (Tr. 73, 148); that 
the runoff starts in March and April (Tr. 142); that Ap-
pellants' irrigation season doesn't start until May 15th 
(Tr. 19, 150); that water probably could be put through 
the Gregory Ditch a month or so before May 15th, and 
transported without any problem of freezing, (Tr. 142). 
One of the Appellants admitted that in some winters it 
might be possible to divert all winter, (Tr. 149). 
The only contention being made on the appeal now 
in regard to injury to prior rights is the contention that 
Appellants have some vested interest in keeping the 
water in the basin and maintaining, in addition to their 
decreed rights, a sub-flow through the entire area. This 
is treated separately under Point IV, and we will deal 
with that point below. 
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C. Feasibility 
The third issue reserved at the pre-trial was whether 
or not the application is feasible. The point is argued at 
length on appeal, and we now turn to a discussion of the 
evidence on this point. The Appellants ignore uncontro-
verted evidence dealing with the question of feasibility. 
First, the State Engineer, Mr. Lambert, testified that 
for irrigation and ranching purposes, the project could 
reasonably bear a cost of $100 per acre foot, ''possibly 
more," and still be a feasible project, (Tr. 23). There 
is no evidence to contradict this. The application (Ex. 
D 4) is for 1,700 acre feet of water, and thus, if the 
Applicants can complete an appropriation for that much 
water, the project could reasonably bear a cost of 
$170,000. 
Secondly, the evidence, without contradiction, shows 
that there is an existing ditch from the Middle Fork of 
Beaver Creek to the East Fork of Beaver Creek, and with 
very little work it would convey 7 cubic feet per second 
(Tr. 75, 78). There is also an existing canal (the Greg-
ory Ditch) from the East Fork of Beaver Creek to the 
proposed reservoir site, and beyond, (Tr. 71). The 
Gregory Ditch has an existing capacity of 30 cubic feet 
per second. The trial court so found, (R. 38), and the 
evidence sustains the finding, (Tr. 66-69, 87-79). 
Neither of these existing ditches is used for irriga-
tion purposes before May 15, (Tr. 7 4, 19, 150). In fact, 
the decree provides that the irrigation season shall be 
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from May 15th to October 15th, (Tr. 19). There is tes-
timony from one of the appellants to the effect that the 
spring runoff starts some years in March and April, (Tr. 
142) and that the water could be taken through the Greg-
ory Ditch until May 15th, without hurting anyone, (Tr. 
142). There is also in evidence the U. S. G. S. daily 
measurements showing the average flow of both the East 
Fork and the Middle Fork of Beaver Creek from Octo-
ber 15th through the following May 15th, (Ex. 5, 6). 
These were reviewed by the trial court, and in the trial 
court's memorandum decision (R. 26), the court noted: 
"For the period May 1st to May 14th, an analy-
sis of the water flow records for the years 1949 
through 1965 reflects average excess flow from 
the Middle and East Forks of Beaver Creek over 
and above the adjudicated rights, of 16.24 c.f.s., 
or 32.5 acre feet per day [which is the amount al-
lowed for livestock water] was approximately 
1,061 acre feet for said fourteen-day period.'' 
In addition to the foregoing, the Gregory Ditch was 
enlarged throughout its entire length in about 1930 (Tr. 
65), so that the water stored in the Hoops Lake Res-
ervoir could be transported through it, (Tr. 71). The 
Hoops Lake water is seldom used before July 1st, 
(Tr. 71). Therefore, this excess capacity in the Gregory 
Ditch is also available from May 15th to July 1st, which 
includes the normal period of peak flows, as can be seen 
from the daily flow records, (Ex. 5, 6), and the graphs 
which were prepared therefrom, (Ex. 13). Specifically, 
when the irrigation season starts for the decreed right 
holders, there is maximum divertible flow of only 9.15 
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c.f.s. in the Gregory Ditch (Tr. 88, and see also Ex. 8, 
where decreed rights are listed under Gregory Canal). 
Thus from May 15th until July 1st, there is approxi-
mately 21 c.f.s. of unused capacity in the Gregory Ditch. 
As to this period of time, the trial court, in its Memo-
randum Decision, after analyzing the water flow charts 
(Ex. 5 and 6) said: 
''For the period from May 15th to June 30th, 
an analysis of the water flow records for the years 
1949 to 1962 reflects that the average daily flow 
in the Middle and East Forks of Beaver Creek 
exceeded adjudicated rights during thirty-six days 
of said period, namely, May 23rd through June 
27th. A computation of the excess daily flow re-
veals that the average excess per day for the thir-
ty-six days was 33.7 c.f .s., which is equivalent to 
67.4 acre feet per day, or 2426 acre feet for said 
thirty-six days." 
We think that this is of substantial importance on 
the issue of f easihility, because substantial quantities of 
water can he diverted from the proposed sources and 
transported to the reservoir site without any enlarge-
ment of either of these ditches. It is obvious from the 
court's memorandum decision that it placed substantial 
weight on this evidence (R. 27). 
Another factor dealing with the feasibility is that 
the applicants own the land they propose to irrigate, (see 
paragraph 12, Ex. D). The application also reveals that 
the 1950 acres of land have a partial water right from 
direct flow rights, and under the Hoops Lake Project (see 
Explanatory Ex. D). Thus there should he no expense 
for clearing the land and constructing a water distribu-
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tion system. There is also testimony that the applicants 
own the rservoir site (Tr. 9). 
The Gregory Ditch has been used by the Hoops Lake 
Project for almost 38 years, (Tr. 65, 72). The present 
applicants own 2,589 out of a total of 4000 shares in the 
Hoops Lake Project, (Tr. 64). While the right to put 
water in the Gregory Ditch was established for the Hoops 
Lake Project water, this court held in Harvey v. Haights 
Creek Irrigation Co., 7 Ut. 2d 58, 318 P. 2d 343 (1957), 
that water can be placed in an existing canal from other 
sources, unless this will cause damage to the servient 
estate. Thus, right-of-way acquisition costs should be 
minimal. 
The language of the Utah Supreme Court in United 
States v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132, supra, is very apropos. The 
court said there that the applicant should have his appli-
cation approved so that he can experiment to see what 
can be done. The court further said that if the applicant 
is required at the approval stage to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he can beneficially use the 
water without interfering with the rights of others, as 
though this were a final determination of rights, it would 
deprive him of an opportunity to experiment and demon-
strate what he can do. The court said that such a system 
would cut off the possibility of establishing many val-
uable rights. Because of this, the court indicated that 
applications should be approved without requiring such 
precise proof. With the approved application, the appli-
cant here will be able to divert water through the existing 
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ditches during the time when the capacity is unused, and 
demonstrate by actual diversion and use the extent to 
which, if any, these canals need to be enlarged. 
The availability of this unused capacity, without any 
expense, would alone justify under the cases the approval 
of the application without any evidence concerning the 
cost of enlarging the canals. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of showing that it 
would be possible, at reasonable expense, to enlarge the 
ditches, should this prove to be necessary or desirable, 
we offered evidence on this point. The Appellants con-
fine their argument to an attack on the figures of Mr. 
Proffitt. The engineer who had been engaged to design 
the project and testify on these cost figures had become 
ill at the last minute, and was not able to appear at the 
trial, (Tr. 9, 49). Mr. Proffitt had prepared some com-
putations and exhibits dealing with the available water 
supply, and he was asked, during the course of the trial, 
(Tr. 108) to develop some normal costs for constructing 
an earthen fill dam of the type contemplated by the 
application and some normal cost figures for this area 
for moving dirt to enlarge an existing canal. As we 
will presently note, he did know normal costs, and we 
think that we established through other witnesses that 
the enlargement of the ditches would present no abnor-
mal problem or expense. 
Hubert Lambert, who is the present State Engineer, 
and who has been with the State Engineer's office for 26 
years (Tr. 18) testified that he has walked the entire 
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length of the Gregory Canal from the point where it 
diverts from the East Fork to the point beyond the 
reservoir site where it empties into Indian Creek, (Tr. 
21, 31). He was asked : 
'' Q. Do you see any particular peculiar engi-
neering problems in enlarging it [the Gregory 
Ditch] unusual costs 1 
''A. Well, no more than you get in any ditch. 
Some of the ditch has areas where it has rather a 
low slope, but it is not something that would be an 
impossibility, no. 
'' Q. Would it be unusually expensive to en-
large? 
"A. Oh, I wouldn't think so." (Tr. 22) 
On cross-examination he was asked to explain what 
he meant by his earlier statement that the ditch could be 
enlarged without unusual expense, and he said that he 
didn't see any major engineering problem, and he would 
think that it would be enlarged with normal expense, 
(Tr. 41). 
The evidence also discloses that the Gregory Ditch 
has already been enlarged once as a part of the Hoops 
Lake Project, (Tr. 71). This enlargement was made 
in about 1930 (Tr. 65). The enlargement at that time 
was for a similar amount of water - the Hoops Lake 
Project is for 4,000 acre feet of water (Tr. 72) but only 
one-half of this - or 2,000 acre feet - went through the 
Gregory Ditch, (Tr. 73). The enlargement covered the 
entire distance from the East Fork to our reservoir site 
and beyond, (Tr. 71). Since the Hoops Lake Project 
has already enlarged the Gregory Canal for 2,000 acre 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
feet of water, it has been demonstrated that this can be 
done. We have a comparable quantity of water avail-
able here (1700 acre feet). (Ex. D) In this regard it 
should be remembered that the last enlargement was in 
about 1930 (Tr. 65), and that the State Engineer had 
walked the whole length of the canal, (Tr. 21, 31) about 
ten years ago (Tr. 31). This was long after the Hoops 
Lake enlargement, and at that time he saw no special 
problem, and thought that the further enlargement could 
be done at normal cost (Tr. 41). The Hoops Lake Proj-
ect had also involved the building of a reservoir in this 
same general area, and it has been in successful use for 
about 38 years, (Tr. 65). Further, should there be any 
problem with the site chosen, Section 73-3-3, U.C.A. 
1953, permits the filing of a change application, chang-
ing the place of storage. 
On the Middle Fork Mr. Hanks testified that he was 
familiar with the existing ditch between the Middle Fork 
and the East Fork; that he was the originator of the 
Hoops Lake Project, and was familiar with the terrain 
and the work done in enlarging the Gregory Ditch, and 
that he thought that enlarging the ditch between the 
middle and east forks would present less problems than 
they had encountered in enlarging the Gregory Ditch, 
Tr. 76). So with these two witnesses we did establish 
that there would be no abnormal problems or expense in 
enlarging these two canals. No evidence was offered to 
contradict this. 
Mr. Proffit was not totally unfamiliar with the area. 
He hadn't walked the entire length of the ditch, but when 
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he was asked how he knew what kind of material the 
canal runs through, he said that in some places it is 
gravel, soil; not too bad, but in other areas there are side-
hills and big boulders. He was asked how he knew this, 
when he hadn't seen it, and he said, "Because I have seen 
the whole area up there. I haven't walked along the 
canal. The ground doesn't change that much." (Tr. 105) 
He was asked to compute the cost of enlarging the 
existing canals in this area to the extent of 10 cubic feet 
per second, (Tr. 103). He stated that the figure he used 
was a conservative figure, and explained that this was so, 
because he had assumed that the velocity of water in the 
canal would he one cubic foot per second, (Tr. 103). On 
cross-examination (Tr. 105) he again said that he knew 
his figures on enlarging the canals were conservative, 
even though he had not run a profile, "because I have as-
sumed the minimum probable velocity of flow in that 
canal, and, therefore, I'm assuming you are moving the 
maximum amount of dirt." (Tr. 105) 
Thus, starting out with the assumption that the 
canal had a flat grade, which would require the removal 
of a maximum quantity of dirt to create canal capacity, 
he thought that 10 cubic feet of capacity could be con-
structed by removing 2,000 cubic yards of dirt per mile, 
(Tr. 103). The costs, he thought, would be between 50 
cents a yard and $1.50 per yard, so that the cost would 
range from $1,000 a mile to $3,000 per mile, depending on 
the terrain, (Tr. 103). On page 104 he was asked if his 
figures were not purely speculative. He stated that on 
the amount to be moved, ''I think my figures are con-
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servative." He was asked if by this he meant that it 
might cost a lot more, and he answered, "No, I don't -
it might cost a lot less. I think my figures are high.'' He 
was then asked how he knew that his figures were high, 
when he hadn't run a profile, and he said that he had 
assumed the minimum probable velocity, and, therefore, 
he was assuming the moving of a maximum amount of 
dirt, (Tr. 105). 
Mr. Proffitt had also, in 1966 and 1967, designed two 
earthen dams. One had been actually constructed, so 
that he knew the construction costs. On the other he 
had just completed his design and cost estimate (Tr. 
101). He said that the only type of dam he would con-
struct in this area with soil conditions as they are would 
be an earthen dam with a core trench, plus carafine and 
recompacting (Tr. 107). He was asked, "How do you 
know what kind of a tie-in you would make, since you 
haven't seen the site," and he answered, "That's the 
only kind I would make on a dam of this size," (Tr. 
107). Again he indicated that the dirt could be moved 
at a cost of $1 per yard, (Tr. 101) and that a dam 300 
feet long and 30 feet high and 10 feet wide at the top 
would take between 15,000 and 20,000 cubic yards, de-
pending on the size of the core trench (Tr. 101). He 
allowed $1.50 per yard for the dirt, tie-in and spillway, 
and stated that at $1.50 per yard there would be plenty 
of money (Tr. 102). The application showed that the 
dam is 30 feet high, (Ex. D 4) and Mr. Hanks testified 
that he has seen the site, and that the dam would be 
about 300 feet long (Tr. 8). Again there was no con-
flicting testimony. 
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We submit that this was a sufficient prima facie 
showing on feasibility. In summary, we showed, with-
out contradiction, that there is substantial unused ca-
pacity in the existing canals, and that this capacity is 
available for substantial periods of time during the high 
spring runoff period. Experimentation of the type dis-
cussed by the Utah Supreme Court in United States v. 
District Court, supra, may very well demonstrate that 
little, if any, enlargement is desirable. Certainly with-
out any enlargement, substantial quantities of water can 
be taken to the place of storage. True, if the application 
should be denied, ''only when it is clear that the applicant 
can establish no valuable right," this application should 
be approved, for some water can assuredly be appro-
priated without any enlargement of either canal. We 
have the testimony of Mr. Hanks (who had seen both 
canals and had worked on enlarging the Gregory Ditch), 
and of Mr. Lambert, (who had walked the entire dis-
tance of the Gregory Canal), that there would be no 
abnormal or unusual expense in enlarging the ditch. Mr. 
Proffitt then testified that if the six-mile total length of 
both ditches (Tr. 76) has to be enlarged on a flat grade, 
thus causing the removal of the maximum quantity of 
dirt, the enlargement could be done for a maximum cost 
of $3
1
000 per mile, or a total of $18,000 (Tr. 103). A 
reservoir of the only type Engineer Proffitt would 
construct in this area (Tr. 107) could be constructed at 
a maximum cost of $30,000, (Tr. 102). The project 
has an economic value of $170,000. The applicants own 
their own land. It is already being irrigated. Certainly 
it does not, therefore, affirmatively appear that there is 
26 
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no reasonable cause for believing that the project is 
feasible. 
No applicant should be required at the approval 
stage to expend the money to completely design a dam, 
spillway, and other works, and to dig test holes and ex-
pend the other substantial amounts of money to assure 
that he has a reservoir site. Such an expenditure of 
money is not warranted initially, because he cannot know 
at the time he files his application whether or not it will 
be rejected on some other valid ground, such as non-
availability of water. Further, if the proposed site is 
on the lands of some third party, he may not be able, as 
a matter of law, to obtain the necessary rights of way to 
do the test work without an approved application. The 
statute clearly contemplates that this will be considered 
in detail by the State Engineer at a later date, for by 
Section 73-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, the applicant is required, 
before he starts construction, to submit detailed plans 
and specifications and to have the State Engineer ap-
prove them. Mr. Lambert testified that this is the normal 
procedure followed by his office (Tr. 24). 
POINT III 
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE WERE FRAMED 
BY A VALID PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
As noted by the court in its Memorandum Decision 
(R. 24), a pre-trial order was entered in this case. The 
parties at the pre-trial stipulated that the issues of fact 
to be tried were as follows : 
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"1. Whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that there is unappropriated water in East 
Beaver Creek and Middle Beaver Creek tribu-. ' tanes of Henrys Fork River, available for diver-
sion, storage and use, as proposed in Application 
No. 34965. 
"2. Whether water can be so diverted, stored 
and used without injury to or conflict with the 
prior rights of the p1anitiff s. 
'' 3. Whether the plan proposed by the above 
numbered application is physically and economi-
cally feasible.'' 
As we have demonstrated above, evidence fully ade-
quate to support the trial court's findings was adduced 
on each of these three issues. However, Appellants now 
contend that notwithstanding their stipulation at the 
pre-trial, the Respondents (who are the applicants) had 
the duty of proving every other factor set forth in Sec. 
73-3-8, U. C. A. 1953. This contention is made for the 
first time on appeal. 
It is true that Sh,ields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Com-
pany, 12 Utah 2d 98, 363 P. 2d 82, holds that on an appeal 
from a decision of the State Engineer, the applicant must 
adduce evidence on all factors noted in Section 73-3-8, 
U.C.A. 1953. However, that case does not hold that where 
the parties have had a pre-trial and agreed upon the 
issues of fact to be tried, the applicant is required to 
disregard the pre-trial order, and prove every fact which 
could have been put in issue under Section 73-3-8. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision noted 
the requirements of Section 73-3-8, U.C.A. 1953, and then 
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stated that there had been a pre-trial order entered on 
stipulation of the parties agreeing on the issues to be 
tried. The issues agreed upon are quoted, and the court 
then noted: 
"From the stipulation, as set forth in the pre-
trial order it is apparent that the plaintiffs do not 
question that the defendants as applicants have 
the financial ability to complete the proposed 
works, nor do they question that the application 
was filed in good faith, and do not assert that 
the application was for purposes of speculation or 
monopoly." (R. 25) 
This is again expressly noted in Conclusion of Law 
No. l, (R. 42). 
The Memorandum Decision was filed on January 11, 
1968, and the Conclusions of Law were entered January 
26, 1968. On February 19, 1968, Appellants filed a mo-
tion for new trial (R. 44). We direct the court's atten-
tion to the fact that this motion did not question the 
above conclusion of the trial court, nor raise any issue 
concerning the applicants' :financial ability and good 
faith. The new trial motion is general in terms, except 
for the contention that the court erred in :finding that the 
project was feasible (R. 44). 
In Point III of Appellants' brief, they urge that Re-
spondents should have offered evidence that Respondents 
had the financial ability to complete the project, and that 
Respondents filed the application in good faith. We sub-
mit that applicants cannot enter into a stipulation at 
the pre-trial agreeing to limit the issues of fact to be 
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tried to the three issues specified in the pre-trial order, 
and then successfully contend for the first time on appeal 
that Appellants should have disregarded the pre-trial 
order, and introduced evidence on factual issues not re-
served in the pre-trial order. 
Because these issues were not set up in the pre-trial 
order, no particular effort was made to offer evidence to 
meet these issues. Even so, the record contains substan-
tial evidence on these matters. The application was in-
troduced in evidence as an exhibit (Ex. D 4). It recites 
in paragraph 11 that the application proposes to provide 
water for 1,950 acres of land. It also recites in the Ex-
planatory that the lands to be irrigated are already being 
irrigated with direct flow rights, and that they also have 
some storage water from Hoops Lake. The application 
form asks in paragraph 12 whether the applicants own 
the land which they propose to irrigate, and the applica-
tion states that the applicants do own their own land. We 
thus have in the application (Ex. D 4) a statement that 
the applicants are the owners of 1,950 acres of irrigated 
land. 
The record also shows that these applicants are the 
owners of 2,589 shares out of the 4,000 shares in the 
Hoops Lake Project, (Tr. 64). That project is a larger 
project than this one, in that it stores 4,000 acre feet 
of water, (Tr. 71, 72), whereas the proposed project 
would store only 1,700, (Ex. D 4). Mr. Lambert testi-
fied that stored water has a value for irrigation and 
ranching of $100 per acre foot, (Tr. 22). Thus, the 
2,589 acre feet of Hoops Lake water that these applicants 
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own would have a value today of $258,900. There is also 
evidence that two of the applicants own the proposed 
reservoir site, (Tr. 9). 
Insofar as the applicants are concerned, the record 
reflects that Mr. Hanks and his son own 1,239 shares of 
the Hoops Lake Project. The Hoops Lake Project was 
constructed around 1930 (Tr. 65). Mr. Hanks was one 
of the men who made the first filing on that project. He 
has been in the ranching business all of his life, (Tr. 66) 
and is now 70 years of age, (Tr. 67). He has lived on 
the ranch he now operates for 50 years, (Tr. 71). Cer-
tainly this evidence shows that he is a man of substance 
and stability, that he is interested in the area, and the 
development of water, and negatives any possible inf er-
ence that the application is speculative. The others also 
own their own land (Ex. 4) and own direct fl.ow rights 
and substantial stock in Hoops Lake, (Tr. 64). 
Appellants point to the fact that Mr. Proffitt was 
asked during the morning of the trial to make some com-
putations on the cost of constructing a dam and the cost 
of installing a ditch. It is true that Mr. Proffitt was asked 
to do this on the day of the trial, (Tr. 108) but the infer-
ence Appellants seek to draw from this is unfair and 
contrary to the record. Appellants stated (page 20 of 
their brief) : 
"When, as here, the evidence shows that Engi-
neer Proffitt was hired to make certain engineer-
ing studies while the case was being tried, and 
that he made the studies during the noon hour, 
and testified shortly after noon, the good faith 
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of the applicants might well be questioned.'' (Tr. 
108) 
The inference Appellants apparently seek to make 
here is that applicants had done no engineering until the 
day of the trial, and did not in good faith intend to 
go ahead with the project. Appellants well know that 
Respondents had engaged an engineer named Miller, who 
designed the dam, and that Mr. Miller became ill, and 
at the last minute was unable to attend the trial, (Tr. 9, 
49, 111). There was also evidence that test holes had 
been dug (Tr. 8), and that the abutment area had been 
exposed down to solid material (Tr. 10). Thus, any in-
ference that no planning had been done until the day of 
the trial is re butted by the record. 
We thus respectfully submit that this issue of the 
Applicant's good faith and :financial ability was elimi-
nated from the trial by the stipulation of the parties at 
the pre-trial, and by the failure of the Appellants to raise 
this matter in any fashion in the court below. We also 
submit that notwithstanding the fact that no specific 
effort was made to introduce evidence bearing directly 
on this point, the record, nevertheless, shows that these 
people are people of substance, who own their own land 
and valuable existing water rights, they are long-time 
residents of the area, and are processing the applica-
tion in good faith. The mere fact that the engineer they 
had engaged was ill, and couldn't come to the trial, thus 
forcing either a continuance or an effort to develop other 
cost figures the day of the trial simply doesn't raise the 
suggested inference of bad faith. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO VESTED RIGHT IN 
THE NATURAL SUBFLOW OF WATER, AND 
NO RIGHT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC WATER 
IN THE NATURAL BASIN. 
What the Appellants apparently contend by their 
Point IV is that neither Schedule A, attached to the 
pre-trial order, nor the decrees in Utah and Wyoming, 
correctly define their rights. They want everything 
awarded to them by those decrees, and then they want 
all of the excess water from this source left undiverted, 
so as to maintain a natural sub-flow or water table 
throughout the area. 
They cite no authority in support of this contention. 
It would appear to be out of harmony with the express 
holding of this court in Weber Basin Conservancy Dis-
trict v. Gailey, 8 Utah 2d 55, 328 P. 2d 175, (1958). On 
rehearing, the court stated the issue as follows: 
"Does an owner of land adjacent to a stream 
have the right to insist that the stream continue 
to flow in its natural channel undiminished, for 
the purpose of maintaining lateral support to 
keep percolating waters within the soil of his 
land~ 
The court in a detailed opinion holds that he has no 
such right. 
EDWARDW. CLYDE 
ROLAND R. WRIGHT 
DALLIN W. JENSEN, Asst. 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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